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"The overriding purpose of our strategic posture is political and defensive: to deny other countries the ability to impose their will on the United States and its allies under the weight of strategic military superiority. We must insure that all potential aggressors see unacceptable risks in contemplating a nuclear attack, or nuclear blackmail, or acts which could escalate to strategic nuclear war, such as a Soviet conventional attack on Europe."

—President Nixon—U.S. Foreign Policy
For The 1970s—February 18

"Our goal is a stable peace. Our strategic policy to achieve that goal is deterrence . . . the basic rationale for United States weapons deployment in the strategic field has been and remains deterrence."

—Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird
Annual Luncheon of the Associated Press,
New York City, April 20

Secretary Laird Hopes For Success At SALT

Reviews Nature, Scope Of Growing Soviet Threat

(Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird gave the following address at the annual luncheon of the Associated Press in New York City April 20.)

When I assumed office 15 months ago, I immediately established as a top priority goal the restoration of credibility in the Department of Defense. Since then we have attempted to follow President Nixon's stated desire to make more information available to the American people.

The editors of the Associated Press and all members of the communications media in this country have a deep interest in this subject. I pledge to you that we shall continue to devote maximum attention to reducing and hopefully eliminating overclassification in the Department of Defense. And, we will provide all the information we can within the limits of national security, consistent with the safety and legal rights of our citizens.

This open news policy has brought about significant progress in at least five major areas where information was previously withheld from the American people.

1. Previous policy was to restrict public discussion of prisoner of war matters. Present policy is to foster public discussion and to focus worldwide attention on the plight of our prisoners of war in order to gain humane treatment for them and to obtain their release.

2. Previous policy was to withhold from the public informa-

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"The military balance between the United States and the USSR has changed significantly. The degree of military superiority that we held five years ago has narrowed in some very important areas, and in some it has disappeared. Over-all, the United States still is militarily superior to the USSR, but it is not an across-the-board superiority."

—General John C. Meyer,
Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force
("Deterrence" begins on Page 8)

"No longer are the Russians 'over there', halfway around the globe. No longer are they operating an archaic fleet in their home waters of the Arctic Ocean and the Baltic.
"The challenge they now pose is a real one—a modern one. It is a growing one. It is just out there."

—Admiral Ephraim P. Holmes
Commander In Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet
("Soviet Capabilities In the Atlantic" begins on Page 12)

Reviews Nature, Scope Of Growing Soviet Threat

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tion on chemical warfare and biological research matters. Present policy is to keep the public informed about our new policies in these two areas, the reasons for these new policies, and the steps being taken to implement them.

3. Previous practices on reporting the costs of major weapons systems led to a major credibility problem in the Department of Defense. Our new policy of full disclosure on major weapons costs will help to restore the Department's credibility and will assist us in gaining better control of costs and in developing better management practices.

4. For several years, the American people were denied knowledge about our activities in Laos. Today, the American people are being informed about what we are doing and what we are not doing in Laos.

5. In the past, overuse of classification denied to the American people pertinent information on the nature and scope of the strategic nuclear threat. In my view, there is still too much classification, but we have tried and will continue to make more and more information available on this subject which is so crucial for the future security of our country.

In my remarks today I will attempt to shed more light on the crucial subject of the strategic threat. In particular, I

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want to discuss with you editors the nature and scope of the growing Soviet threat, recognizing full well that, in Vienna, our negotiators have just begun round two of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, commonly called SALT.

I hope for success at SALT. I want to emphasize that point. I also want to emphasize that our top military leadership hopes for success at SALT. Where the security of the United States is involved, it is this objective—insuring national security—which is most important. A lower-cost means to achieve that objective, lower compared to what otherwise may be required,—if it can be achieved within tolerable risks—is obviously most desirable to all Americans, civilian and military.

The budget we have recommended to Congress for the next fiscal year demonstrates how deeply the Nixon Administration is committed to progress at SALT. We have called this year's Defense Budget a transitional budget. It is transitional because in terms of military capability, it is basically a status quo, stand-pat budget. We have postponed basic national security decisions in the strategic field in order to give maximum opportunity for SALT to be successful, and to foster a meaningful beginning for the era of negotiation President Nixon and the American people seek.

The objective of the Nixon Administration is to restore and maintain peace. With regard to SALT, the President's actions and words document this Administration's accent on negotiation rather than confrontation.

In my Defense Report to Congress in February, I expressed concern that the United States, by the mid-1970s, could find itself in a second-rate strategic position with regard to the future security of the Free World.

Today, in keeping with our policy of maximum information, I intend to present additional reasons for this concern.

It is important to discuss the growing strategic threat be-

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cause it is essential for the American people to understand the complex issues involved, if we are to insure our national security interests through the decade of the 1970s. The American people need to understand the reasons President Nixon is pursuing the course he has recommended in this year's transitional budget.

As Secretary of Defense, I must face the fact that we are taking a risk by postponing hard decisions which the increasing Soviet threat poses for us. I recognize that in the interests of lasting peace, some risks must be taken. But, it is my judgment that as the American people are provided additional information, such as we are discussing here today, they will agree that we are literally at the edge of prudent risk. And the inescapable conclusion will be that if the Soviet strategic offensive buildup continues, the risk to our nation will become too great to sustain without major offsetting actions.

Therefore, what I particularly want to focus on today is the basic asymmetry between what the United States has been doing and what the Soviet Union has been doing in the field of strategic nuclear weapons in recent years.

In a word, for the past five years, the United States has virtually been in neutral gear in the deployment of strategic offensive forces, while the Soviet Union has moved into high gear in both deployment and development of strategic nuclear weapons. In the 1965-67 time period, the United States decided on a level of strategic nuclear forces, including Multiple

Independently Targeted Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs), which was deemed adequate to preserve our deterrent posture for the threat of the 1970 which was projected then. No basic change has been made in the force level decision established in the mid-1960s.

The Soviet Union, by contrast, has engaged in a major effort since 1965 to change the balance of power. The United States

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then, unlike the situation today, clearly occupied a superior position.

Except for the minimum "hedge" that SAFEGUARD will provide, we have not responded to the Soviet strategic offensive buildup with new deployment programs. We did not respond in past years because the United States deliberately chose to assume that the Soviet buildup at most was aimed at achieving a deterrent posture comparable to that of the United States. We have not responded this year because, as I have said, we fervently hope that SALT can render such a response unnecessary.

As much as we might wish it otherwise, however, we must concentrate our attention on what the Soviet Union is actually doing. In the current situation of a diminishing U.S. deterrent and Soviet momentum, we simply cannot base our plans and programs on what we hope the Soviet Union may do either unilaterally or in SALT. The Soviets have a momentum going both in strategic weapons deployments and in strategic weapons developments. If their strategic posture could be expected to stay at the operationally deployed posture which exists today, I believe we would have a tolerable situation. What must concern us, however, is the momentum the Soviets have established both in deployments and developments and where that momentum may carry them.

Let me explain in more detail the basic problem.

The most crucial aspect of national security is the strategic balance between nations that have competing interests in the world. The strategic balance has a direct effect on relations between the superpowers. It has an indirect effect on other nations both in terms of their own relations with each other and in terms of their relations with the superpowers. As one example, a situation of clear superiority on the part of the Soviet Union would have profound implications for any future political or military confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. In fact, a clear strategic superiority on the part of the Soviet Union would affect our interests and our obligations throughout the world.

In our continuing debate on defense matters, it has been said many times that the driving force behind the so-called strategic arms race is the "action-reaction" phenomenon. The recent ABM-MIRV discussions in this country illustrate this. The argument is made, for instance, that the deployment of defensive missiles by one side tends to generate increased offensive deployments by the other side.

I certainly agree that one side's actions definitely can influence what the other side does. But just as weapons in themselves are not the cause of wars, neither are a country's actions in weapons deployment—in themselves—the driving force in a so-called arms race. The fundamental driving force in an arms race is what one country perceives as possible objectives of another country's actions.

Let me explain it this way. Our goal is a stable peace. Our strategic policy to achieve that goal is deterrence. As publicly stated, the basic rationale for United States weapons deployment in the strategic field has been and remains deterrence. Our actions of the past several years underscore the fact that deterrence is our fundamental policy and that we seek no more than a posture of effective deterrence.

Because we in the United States seek a posture of deterrence to protect our interests and those of our allies, we obviously could recognize as legitimate a Soviet desire for a comparable deterrent to protect its interests.

I know that the actions of the Soviet Union in recent years have raised questions in the minds of some of you editors and others about the true objectives they are pursuing.

As I have said many times, I do not believe that it is appropriate for me, as Secretary of Defense, to attempt to assess the strategic intentions of another country. However, under my responsibilities, I must be concerned about present and potential strategic capabilities.

You representatives of a free press understand fully the national security price an open society must pay when competing with adversaries who cloak their plans in secrecy and at-

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tempt to hide both their objectives and their hardware behind the mantle of a closed society. The whole world knows what we in the United States have and what we plan in the national security field. Meaningful essentials are laid bare in an open forum—in official statements, in Congressional hearings, in the give and take of Congressional and public debate and in the reports of a free and competitive press. I would not have it any other way.

Let me emphasize again my conviction that the American people have a right to know even more than has been available in the past about matters which affect their safety and security. There has been too much classification in this country. In

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Reviews Nature, Scope Of Growing Soviet Threat

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particular, too much has been withheld in the past about what has been going on in the closed societies of the Soviet Union and Communist China.

As we all pray for success in Vienna, let me point out that, in my view, the American people will support an arms limitation agreement only if they are confident they have the relevant facts about the strategic balance.

The facts I am about to present are not taken from external Soviet discussions of their strategic forces. They do not come from press conferences in Moscow, from testimony in the Kremlin, from news stories in Pravda, or from published annual Defense Reports by Marshal Grechko.

Rather, the information I am presenting to you is based on our own observations of what the Soviets are doing—and on our belief that this information and these facts should not be withheld from the American people and should be made available to others in the world.

Let us examine what has happened in the past five years to shift the relationship between U.S. and Soviet strategic forces and to provide an accelerated momentum to the Soviets in the strategic field:

In 1965, the Soviet Union had about 220 launchers for the relatively old-fashioned missiles—SS-6s, SS-7s and SS-8s—somewhat similar to our TITAN. We had 54 TITANs in the inventory at that time.

Today, these two forces remain essentially the same. So in this category of old-fashioned multimegaton weapons the Soviets had and still maintain a better than 4-1 advantage.

In 1965, the Soviet Union had no relatively small ICBM launchers comparable to our MINUTEMAN. By 1965, we had 880 MINUTEMAN missiles operational and had established that the total force level for MINUTEMAN would be 1,000 launchers. In the 1965-67 period, the United States finalized plans to convert a portion of the established MINUTEMAN force to a MIRV MINUTEMAN III configuration.

Today, the Soviet Union has over 800 such launchers operational, and a projected force that could exceed 1,000 launchers within the next two years. These launchers include both the SS-11 and SS-13 missiles. Concurrently, flight testing of an improved SS-11 missile continues. Thus, at present construction rates, the Soviets will achieve parity in MINUTEMAN-type launchers within the next two years or so and could move into a substantial lead in this category by the mid-1970s if they continue to deploy these missiles. The previously scheduled U.S. program to MIRV a substantial part of MINUTEMAN continues in progress.

In 1965, there were no operational launchers for the large Soviet SS-9 missile which, in its single warhead version, can carry up to 25 megatons.

Today, I can report to you that there are some 220 SS-9s operational with at least 60 more under construction. Testing of an SS-9 multiple reentry vehicle—the triplet version—continues. The U.S. has no counterpart to this program involving large missiles. So, in this area, the Soviets have and will maintain a monopoly.

In 1965, neither a depressed trajectory ICBM nor a Fractional Orbital Bombardment System existed in either the Soviet or U.S. inventory.

Today, the Soviets have tested both configurations and could have an operational version already deployed. The United States has developed nothing comparable to these systems.

In 1965, the Soviet Union had about 25 launchers for Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) on nuclear submarines, and about 80 more on diesel submarines. Most were designed for surface launch only. The U.S. had 464 SLBM launchers operational on 29 submarines in 1965 and Congress had authorized the last of the 41 nuclear-powered submarines in our POLARIS force in the previous fiscal year.

Today, the Soviets have over 200 operational launchers on nuclear submarines for submerged launch SLBMs and about 70 operational launchers on diesel submarines. In the next two years, the Soviets are expected to have some 400-500 operational launchers on POLARIS-type submarines, and at present construction rates—6-8 submarines a year—could match or exceed the number in the U.S. force by 1974-75. United States POLARIS submarines still number 41 and no increase is projected in current plans. Conversion of 31 of our POLARIS submarines to the MIRVed POSEIDON missile is planned, and eight conversions have already been authorized by Congress.



Minuteman

In 1965, there was no development underway of a so-called Undersea Long-Range Missile System (ULMS) in the United States and there appeared to be none in the Soviet Union.

Today, the United States is spending relatively small sums in the research and development area on preliminary investigations of such a system. I can also report to you today that the Soviet Union, on the other hand, already is testing a new, long-range missile for possible naval use.

In 1965, the Soviet heavy bomber force consisted of slightly over 200 aircraft, about 50 of which were configured as tankers. The U.S. heavy bomber force strength was about 780 in 1965.

Today, the Soviet heavy bomber force is slightly under 200,

Polaris

with about 50 still configured as tankers. U.S. heavy bomber strength has declined to about 550 today.

In 1965, we estimated that the Soviet Union had a complex of ABM launchers being constructed around Moscow as well as a number of radars under construction which could provide early warning acquisition and tracking functions for ABM use.

Today, we believe that 64 Moscow ABM launchers are operational together with sophisticated early warning radars and tracking capabilties. ABM testing for new and/or improved systems continues. Today, the first two SAFEGUARD sites have been authorized, but will not be operational before 1974-75. This modified deployment schedule is considerably behind the schedule Congress had approved in 1967 for the planned SENTINEL area defense, which called for initial capability in 1972, and nation-wide coverage in 1975.

Thus, in the space of five years—from 1965 to 1970—the Soviet Union has more than tripled its inventory of strategic offensive nuclear weapon launchers from about 500 to about 1,700—which includes some 200 heavy bombers in both totals—and continues the momentum of a vigorous construction program. In that same period, the Soviet Union has virtually quadrupled the total megatonnage in its strategic offensive force. The United States, on the other hand, in the same time period, made no increase in its established level of 1,710 strategic nuclear missile launchers and reduced its heavy bomber strength of 780 by over 200. In that same period the United States also reduced its megatonnage by more than 40 per cent.



Titan Poseidon

'MIRV is needed to preserve our deterrent . . . the reoriented SAFEGUARD program, initiated last year, is designed to provide protection for our land-based deterrent forces, the Minuteman and bombers.'

THE THREAT

		ESTIMATED DATE AS OF FEB 70
CHINESE ICBM	FIRST TEST	1970
CHINESE ICBM	EARLIEST OPERATIONAL DATE	1973
SOVIET ICBM's	OPERATIONAL	OVER 1100
SOVIET SS-9's	OPERATIONAL OR UNDER CONSTRUCTION	OVER 275
SOVIET Y CLASS	SUBMARINES WITH SLBM's	OVER 9

To repeat: The United States has taken no action to increase the total of approved strategic offensive delivery vehicles in the past five years in response to the rapid growth in Soviet strategic delivery vehicles. We have, of course, maintained certain options and other steps have been taken to preserve our deterrent in the face of this increase.

Two programs that have been the subject of intense public discussion are, of course, our MIRV and SAFEGUARD systems.

Let me emphasize that MIRV is needed to preserve our deterrent. Many people do not fully understand why it is necessary for us to continue the previously planned, Congressionally-approved and funded deployment of MIRV systems. The point

'For the past five years, the United States has virtually been in neutral gear in the deployment of strategic offensive forces, while the Soviet Union has moved into high gear in both deployment and development of strategic nuclear weapons.'

is made that the current number of strategic nuclear weapons on alert in our force is sufficient for immediate retaliatory use in a crisis. Because MIRVing would more than double the number of deliverable weapons, the conclusion is drawn that this is unnecessary.

This conclusion could be valid, if we assumed that the POLARIS, MINUTEMAN, and bomber forces all would survive a surprise attack and that the Soviet Union would not

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deploy an extensive ABM system. However, as was pointed out in my Defense Report in February, the rapidly-growing Soviet strategic offensive forces could seriously threaten both the U.S. MINUTEMAN and strategic bomber forces by the mid-1970s.

Assuming we do not take additional actions to offset the expanding threat—and this apparently is what some people urge—I must, as Secretary of Defense, face the disquieting possibility that in the mid-to-late 1970s we would no longer be able to rely on either the bomber or MINUTEMAN force to survive a surprise attack. In such a situation, we would be left with only the POLARIS/POSEIDON deterrent force in our strategic arsenal for high confidence retaliatory purposes. This would pose intolerable risks for American security.

'As the experience of the past five years demonstrates, it would be dangerous and imprudent to place unquestioned reliance on the invulnerability of any single strategic system for more than five to seven years into the future.'



U.S. Air Force B-52 of the Strategic Air Command

Thus, the critical choice in the face of that situation is this:

1. Do we rely on the fraction of 656 current weapons that will be at sea on our POLARIS force if we do not convert to POSEIDON and do not defend our land-based strategic forces?
2. Or, do we continue the previously established program to convert 31 POLARIS submarines to the long-approved POSEIDON MIRV program—which would provide approximately the same number of sea-based retaliatory weapons on alert that we currently have today in the sea-based and land-based retaliatory forces combined, but with much reduced megatonnage?

Pending a successful outcome in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, therefore, prudence dictates that we must continue our approved program to MIRV current forces.

Moreover, as the experience of the past five years demonstrates, it would be dangerous and imprudent to place unquestioned reliance on the invulnerability of any single strategic system for more than five to seven years into the future.

This is why we must also, at the very least, preserve an option to defend a portion of our land-based retaliatory forces. That is a major part of what the proposed minimal addition to the SAFEGUARD defensive program is designed to do. I will come back to that.

Because we want to give the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks every chance of succeeding, we are deliberately accepting certain risks by postponing hard choices related to strategic offensive weapons. These risks are acceptable only in the context of proceeding with the MIRV deployments that have been programmed and approved for several years and the SAFEGUARD increment we are recommending this year.

A second and equally important reason for MIRV is that it helps preserve our deterrent by increasing confidence in our ability to penetrate Soviet strategic defensive forces which, by the mid-to-late 1970s, also could be quite formidable. In addition to the extensive air defense capabilities they already possess, the Soviets are pursuing a vigorous anti-ballistic missile research and development program designed to improve the present operational system or to develop substantially better second-generation ABM components.

We now have evidence that the Soviet Union is testing an improved long-range ABM missile. They are also expanding their radar surveillance coverage. We cannot rule out the possibility that they have or will give the extensively deployed

'What must concern us, however, is the momentum the Soviets have established both in deployments and developments and where that momentum may carry them.'

SA-5 surface-to-air missile system an ABM role. We believe such a role is technically feasible for this system.

With regard to SAFEGUARD, which I mentioned previously, let me say this. In addition to other objectives, the reoriented SAFEGUARD program, initiated last year, is designed to provide protection for our land-based deterrent forces, the MINUTEMAN and bombers. As you know, the President directed that each phase of the SAFEGUARD deployment is to be reviewed each year to ensure that we are doing as much as necessary but not more than that required by the threat. The increments of SAFEGUARD proposed so far will provide protection for a portion of our land-based deterrent, and permit flexibility with regard to our future course of action.

Without approval by Congress of the Modified Phase II SAFEGUARD protection proposed by the President, we would be forced to recommend going forward this year with other strategic nuclear offensive force programs.

All of my comments so far have, of course, been focused on the more immediate and troublesome threat posed by the Soviet strategic force buildup. The nuclear weapons program of Communist China also concerns us and directly relates to the need for preserving timely SAFEGUARD options as we move toward the mid-1970s. Time does not permit a discussion of this issue and the interrelationship of maintaining adequate strategic offensive and defensive forces to meet both the Soviet and Communist Chinese threats.

Where does all this leave us, and what is President Nixon attempting to do with the decisions he has incorporated in his Fiscal Year 1971 Transitional Defense Budget?

Clearly, this Administration has not accelerated the previously planned deployment of offensive systems during our 15 months in office. On the contrary, we have slowed it down. The only major change we have made has been modification of the previously approved SENTINEL ABM deployment; and that change was a slowdown, not a speedup. We slowed the original deployment plan Congress approved, keyed it to the emerging threat on an annual review basis, and reoriented it to provide more timely protection needed for our land-based deterrent forces.

If the programmed forces established by the last Administration some years ago and approved by Congress were deemed appropriate and necessary for the security of the United States in the 1970s against the then projected threat, I am at a loss to understand how critics can claim that the Nixon Administration has escalated the arms race. The record clearly shows that we have not done so. We have chosen instead to defer major new weapons decisions as long as possible pending developments in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. In continuing the MIRV and ABM programs, we are simply going ahead with programs on which our deterrent policy was formulated by previous Administrations, even before the current momentum of Soviet strategic programs became clear.

'I will continue to hope that the shift in national priorities we have instituted in America will be duplicated in the Soviet Union.'

With regard to the important talks which have just resumed in Vienna, the President has stated that every U.S. system is negotiable. To those who argue that the U.S. should take specific and, perhaps, unilateral action at the start of these negotiations, I would reply that the place to resolve these issues is at the conference table with the Soviets. Let us try to find out at the conference table the meaning of the Soviet Union's increased weapons deployments and let us conduct these important negotiations with full recognition of these continuing Soviet deployments.

My appraisal today has covered some of the available evidence of the Soviet military buildup. I am not unmindful, however, of possible other directions of Soviet policy that could be relevant to our security. There have been reports that Soviet economic problems may place pressure upon their leadership to devote major attention to internal matters, thus reducing the recent emphasis on a continued military buildup.

As Secretary of Defense, I will continue to hope that the shift in national priorities we have instituted in America will be duplicated in the Soviet Union. But until evidence of that shift is discernible in weapons deployment activities, I have no alternative but to base my actions and recommendations on the evidence available, much of which I have shared with you editors today and, through you, with the American people.

'Let us try to find out at the conference table the meaning of the Soviet Union's increased weapons deployments and let us conduct these important negotiations with full recognition of these continuing Soviet deployments.'

GENERAL MEYER

DETERRENCE

Military Balance Between U.S.–USSR Has Narrowed

By General John C. Meyer
Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force

(Following is the text of a speech by General Meyer at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces National Security Seminar, Colorado Springs, Colo.)

There are many facets to the total makeup of national security. Perhaps most apparent to those of us in or very closely associated with the Armed Forces, is the relative balance of power between the U.S. and our potential adversaries. My subject is "Deterrence."

When used in connection with "national security," deterrence is presenting convincing evidence to any potential aggressor that the costs or risks involved in initiating war outweigh his chance of gain under any circumstance.

President Nixon, in a message to Congress on Feb. 18, stated that the overriding purpose of our strategic posture is *"to deny other countries the ability to impose their will on the United States and its allies under the weight of military superiority."* He continued by stating, *"We must insure all potential aggressors see unacceptable risks in contemplating a nuclear attack, or nuclear blackmail."* Measures taken to deter an enemy focus on his decision-making process, not on what we believe.

Communist Objective Unchanged

The announced Communist objective of world domination has not changed. That we know. But, we cannot determine with accuracy what their intentions might be five or 10 years in the future. They will be influenced by what we in this country do.

Between 1964 and 1969, there was a considerable increase in the U.S. Defense Budget. Inflation absorbed part of this increase, but even when 1969 dollars are adjusted for inflation our Defense Budget grew in purchasing power by about 27 per cent.

Something over 32 per cent of recent Defense appropriations has gone to support the Vietnam war. Another 3.5 per cent has been absorbed by retired pay. Military pay scales have improved. When these things are taken into account, fewer Defense dollars have been left for new equipment than were available in 1964.

This is notably true in the case of the Air Force. Our Fiscal Year 1970 budget, when translated to 1964 dollars, is going to come out to about $20 billion. The 1964 Air Force Budget was just under $20 billion. A large part of Air Force appropriations during the past five years has gone to support Southeast Asia operations. There had to be a slowdown in force modernization, a decline in the size of forces not primarily involved in the Vietnam war and, perhaps most important in the long term, deceleration of some research and development programs.

USSR Military Budget

The history of the Soviet Union's military budget during the same five years—1964 to 1969—is somewhat different. Their announced Armed Forces budgets have increased by 38 per cent. Their support of North Vietnam, though considerable, has cost between a quarter and a half billion dollars a year during the last three years. Heavy Soviet investment has gone into its own force modernization and expansion programs.

The military balance between the United States and the USSR has changed significantly. The degree of military superiority that we held five years ago has narrowed in some very important areas, and in some it has disappeared. Over-all,

'As we now stand, the Soviet ICBM force, together with their existing submarine-launched ballistic missiles, has more than twice the payload of the entire U.S. land- and sea-based missile force.'

the United States still is militarily superior to the USSR but it is not an across-the-board superiority. In some sectors—airlift, for example—we remain clearly ahead. In others—ICBMs, to cite one—the USSR has passed us in both number and deliverable megatonnage.

Shifts In Military Balance

I want to give you a few specific examples of shifts in the U.S.-Soviet military balance in those functional areas that are of primary concern to the Air Force. This is useful in defining the planning and management environment of the next few years.

The most striking is, as I have suggested, in the strategic area. In 1965, we had about 880 land-based ICBMs compared to the USSR's 220. Today the U.S. ICBM inventory numbers 1,054 compared to more than 1,100 Soviet ICBM launchers either in place or under construction. At least 220 of their launchers are for SS-9s that have been tested with three reentry vehicles, each able to carry a five megaton warhead. We have, of course, improved the quality of our missile force. So have the Soviets improved theirs. As we now stand, the Soviet ICBM force, together with their existing submarine-launched ballistic missiles, has more than twice the payload of the entire U.S. land- and sea-based missile force.

Strategic Bomber Superiority

What margin of strategic superiority we have today rests largely on the Strategic Air Command bomber force. That force has been reduced since 1965 by the retirement of older models, from about 750 B-52s and B-58s to a current total of approximately 450 B-52s. The two wings of B-58s—approximately 80 aircraft—will be phased out as an about-equal number of FB-111s begin to join the force.

We now have more than twice as many strategic bombers as the Soviets, if we consider only their 200 heavy bombers. They also have 750 medium bombers, at least some of which could be used against the U.S. with enroute refueling or on one-way missions. These medium bombers should not be entirely discounted in any assessment of the balance.

Our numerical bomber superiority is somewhat less impressive when one looks at the extent and sophistication of Soviet air defenses. Their warning, control and ground-to-air missile systems are advanced and numerous. The USSR also has developed at least nine new fighters during the 1960s. Some were designed primarily as bomber interceptors and some for air-to-air combat with other fighters. Nearly all could be used for air defense.

The USSR now has more than 3,000 interceptors in their air defense system, compared to a much smaller and older U.S. interceptor force. In 1965, the U.S. Air Force had 775 interceptors in the active force. By next summer, we will have about 250 left. The most modern is the F-106, an interceptor designed for defense against high altitude attack. It joined our operational units in 1960.

In the general purpose area, the Soviets have about 3,600 tactical aircraft—roughly twice as many as the U.S. Air Force. Except for the air superiority role, our tactical fighters are generally superior to theirs. However, their MIG-21—not the newest Soviet fighter—is in some respects the equal of our best air superiority fighter, the F-4E. The F-4 was designed in the 1950s. Although the latest models are greatly improved, it is neither technically possible nor economically feasible to make the F-4 a better air superiority fighter than fighters the Soviets are now bringing into their forces. It's also worth noting that the USSR has provided MIG-21s to 19 other countries.



F-4s on a test flight

Today, the average age of U.S. Air Force aircraft is more than nine years. Our Fiscal Year 1970 budget includes funds for the purchase of about 450 new aircraft for Air Force units. Some 160 of these are first line fighters. That's the smallest aircraft buy since World War II.

The picture is not as stark as it might appear from the contrasts I've made. For one thing, I've singled out only the major areas where we have lost ground in the past five years. Also, taking one weapon system or mission area at a time, as I've done, doesn't reveal the reinforcing relationships between weapon systems—bombers (where we still have a lead) and missiles (where we don't), for instance. A more precise assessment has to take into account the interactions of all offensive and defensive forces on both sides; the relationships between strategic, tactical and airlift elements; and the full

'We are not at a point of dire peril; we are at a point where concern is justified.'

(Continued On Page 10)

DETERRENCE

Military Balance Between U.S.–USSR Has Narrowed

(Continued From Page Nine)

array of air, land and sea forces of both potential opponents. Geography, economics and alliance systems also affect the balance.

Concern Is Justified

When those elements are harmonized, my earlier statement that the U.S. still has some degree of military superiority is supportable. We are not at a point of dire peril; we are at a point where concern is justified.

I do think that optimism about future Defense programs is in order, even though the Defense Budget may be somewhat smaller in the foreseeable future. The Vietnamization Program (a component of the President's program for peace) is progressing beyond our expectations. As our requirements to assist in the defense of South Vietnam decrease, a larger share of Defense appropriations should become available for modernization. Smaller Defense Budgets will be partially compensated by reductions in manpower.

Elements Of Modern Defense Strategy

There is a growing recognition of the need for U.S. investment in up-to-date weapon systems as the expansion and refinement of Soviet military forces and equipment, and the

'The credibility of our strategic forces strongly influence what we can and cannot do.'

chinks in our own armor become more clearly visible. If the trends of the last five years in U.S. and Soviet military development were to continue for long, balance in the two key

F-15, an air superiority fighter for USAF

elements of modern defense strategy would be transformed to our grave disadvantage. Those elements are:

—FIRST, *strategic nuclear forces of sufficient size, quality and flexibility to deter an attack on the United States, to discourage any other nation from either nuclear or conventional attack on our major allies, and to insure our national interests against nuclear blackmail. This is a capability we have had for many years. I believe it to be essential so long as the freedom, independence and self-determination of nations are not adequately protected by international law. No other free world nation can provide this protective shield.*

—SECOND, *the ability to gain and maintain air superiority over any battlefield where U.S. forces may have to be committed. Without air superiority, neither air nor surface forces can operate effectively in most combat situations.*

U.S. Air Force Priorities

Retaining these two key capabilities sets the top priorities for Air Force planners and managers. The priorities are:

—Modernization of the bomber element of strategic offensive forces. We do not have approval to build the B-1. If we get



B-1, a proposed follow-on strategic bomber for USAF

subsequent approval for full-scale production, this aircraft can go operational probably in late 1977. The B-1 force that we hope to have will be smaller than the present bomber force, but as effective in the late 1970s as our present bomber force is today.

—Our strategic defensive forces have long suffered from under-funding. If they are to carry their share of the deterrent load, we must have three things: A new interceptor with greater speed, range and a look-down/shoot-down capability; AWACS for airborne warning and control; and over-the-horizon radar for improved warning. If funding for a new interceptor is not provided, we should, at the minimum, improve the F-106 with downward looking radar and a better air-to-air missile.

—Of parallel importance is the F-15 air superiority fighter. With an early go-ahead on full-scale production, we could have the first F-15s in operation by about 1975.

There are, of course, other systems and sub-systems that are needed. One is the AX, an inexpensive attack aircraft to round out the close support team of F-4 and A-7 tactical aircraft. Another is better systems for locating and hitting small targets. In the air campaign of any future conventional war, we don't want to have to go back to a target several

A-7D tactical aircraft

times with an armada of fighter-bombers, tankers, air superiority fighters and electronic countermeasures aircraft.

Continued work is essential on penetration aids for both missiles and aircraft, protective devices for ICBM sites, an advanced ballistic missile defense concept, and preliminary

'We in the military must be ready to furnish our national leaders with a full-range of choices in any given situation. These choices will depend on the abilities of our forces.'

study and research on the next generation of weapons that ultimately will follow those that now are on the drawing board.

Fundamental to the whole process is an active research and development program. This is another area where the Soviets are giving us a great deal of competition. Dr. John Foster, Director of Defense Research and Engineering, has said that the Soviets' annual increase in R&D funding has been running about 10 per cent, compared to a four per cent annual growth in U.S. R&D. In our case, the increase is just about enough to offset inflation. Dr. Foster estimates that Soviet investment in R&D either has already exceeded ours, or is about to do so.

President Nixon in his Feb. 18 message to Congress said, "The Soviets' present build-up of strategic forces, together with what we know about their development and test programs, raises serious questions about where they are headed and the potential threats we and our allies face. These questions must be faced soberly and realistically."

There is a growing tendency in some circles to ignore or down-grade the military threat. I speak of the widely spread assumption about the intentions of the Soviets. Repeatedly we hear that they consider a massive strike against this country to be inconceivable. I believe that people who adhere to this view, either ignore the obvious strategic build-up by the Soviets, or assume that their purpose is deterrence only. In my opinion, a massive first strike by the Soviets can never be ruled out as a possibility by those responsible for the defense of our country.

The continued expansion of the Soviet land-based and sea-based strategic missile forces, their repeated testing of a fractional orbit bombardment system, and the improvement of their defense system against bombers and ballistic missiles have very nearly tipped the balance of power in their favor. The potential is so grave that we must continue to give first priority to the task of developing our forces to cope with the threat.

We in the military must be ready to furnish our national leaders with a full-range of choices in any given situation. These choices will depend on the abilities of our forces. They will be varied or very limited, dependent upon those abilities. The credibility of our strategic forces strongly influence what we can and cannot do.

The current attitude toward limiting Defense spending

'When our strategic forces present the potential enemy a clear picture of our ability to emerge from a massive nuclear exchange with a relative military advantage, we will have an effective deterrent.'

is evident both in Congress and the highest levels of government. This attitude is not likely to wane or disappear over the next few years. The proposed FY 1971 budget is, in the words of Secretary of Defense Laird, "a rock bottom budget." Efforts will undoubtedly continue to bring Defense programs to a lower level considered proper in relation to other demands. But with our national security at stake, we must also be careful not to cut our force so thin that it presents a threat to the security of this nation.

When our strategic forces present the potential enemy a clear picture of our ability to emerge from a massive nuclear exchange with a relative military advantage, we will have an effective deterrent.

Today you conclude a most comprehensive review of our national security posture and the myriad factors that influence and shape our international affairs. I urge your continued study of the problems and potentials presented and your continued support and contributions for security in the future.

U.S. Air Force's new FB-111

Soviet Capabilities In The Atlantic

By Admiral Ephraim P. Holmes
Commander In Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet

(Here is the text of an address by Admiral Holmes to members of the U.S. Naval Academy Alumni Association, Washington, D.C.)

ADMIRAL HOLMES

It is a great pleasure for me to be here today, and to have the opportunity to address you. I could ask you to join with me in a few choruses of "Forty Years On From Dear Old Crabtown," but will forego that. I want to discuss very candidly with you today, a matter which quite frankly concerns me. It is a problem of tremendous magnitude; yet, one of which too many Americans know very little and which some, I'm afraid, prefer to ignore.

This is the capability which might be ranged against our national security by the Soviet Navy in the Atlantic. Speaking as a commander in the Atlantic wearing several hats, this is a matter which faces me daily. It is not to be taken lightly nor should it be pushed lightly from our ken.

When we speak of the Atlantic and the Atlantic Command, we're talking about an area of approximately 52 million square miles of ocean—about 40 per cent of the earth's surface. Traditionally, and for good reason, this has been the domain of American and Allied seapower. The outcome of two World Wars swung critically on the outcome of our engagements in this ocean. Many of you participated in these conflicts. The Atlantic has the same, or greater, potential today and the evidence is already there.

The Atlantic provides trade lanes between Europe and North America and is a vital line of communications. If you accept the postulate that the defense of the United States starts in Europe and that that in turn underlies our support of NATO, then you have to accept that control of the Atlantic is indeed vital. At certain times in our history, it has been called an "American Lake" where U.S. and friendly vessels were able to come and go because we had to see to it that they could come and go. Today we need to think of it as at least a "NATO Lake" and all that that implies for many of the same reasons. I think it is in danger of not being so recognized and, in fact, of being sharply contested, even today.

Why?

During the past two decades, the picture has been changing. The Atlantic, once the milieu principally of American and NATO seapower, is now also the milieu of a large portion of Soviet maritime power.

I stand before you, not as a naval officer crying simply "Wolf," but as one who has responsibilities in this area facing a potential menace not only to our freedom in this sea, but to our very security.

That is why today, I would like to take a few moments to describe this Soviet maritime presence to you and what it means to us.

It's not enough, when addressing this important topic, merely to quote numbers of ships and units, although this is helpful in establishing one dimension of the subject. I would like to go one step further, and describe to you some of the maritime strategies which the Soviets have available to them by virtue of their increasingly stronger Navy. I'd like to analyze what they may plan to do with their assets and to describe certain trends which I think can be detected in their maritime strategies.

Soviet Naval Strength

First of all, I believe that I should state that there is no discernible indication that a war with the Soviet Union is likely in the immediate future. I know that all of you strongly hope as I do that our deterrent policy will continue to be effective and that a war between the two great powers can be prevented. What I am saying here is that we must maintain a posture of strength and a high state of readiness, for these are vital both to the maintenance of peace and to our capability to defend our country against attack.

Now, let's look at a few figures. As you know, the Soviet Navy is the second largest in the world—second today only to that of the United States. It is first—number one—in submarine strength. It is first in fast, missile-firing boats such as the Osa's and Komar's.

The Soviets are strong in several other areas. I suspect they are first in mine-laying capability, for example, backed by a traditional propensity for this kind of warfare. The Rus-

sians boast a growing amphibious capability and a versatile surface fleet with the latest weapons systems—including surface-to-surface missiles.

The Soviet naval air arm is an integral and growing part of their maritime force.

The Russian fleet is growing, both in size and quality. And, it's growing bolder. Their ships and aircraft are new, their crews well-trained. It is a professional fleet in the sense which you here would fully appreciate.

These are, of course, generalized appraisals. Let me be a little more specific. To do this, I would like to list briefly some of the Soviet Union's maritime forces. I shall not divide these figures among the various Russian fleets because, *(1)* the high mobility of naval forces, as you know, permits inter-fleet deployments and, *(2)* such a division is largely academic. I say this because I am sure their strategy is global and geography is less important in such case.

First, the Soviet Navy has two helicopter carriers now in operation. These ships are tasked principally with an anti-submarine warfare mission. But they certainly have the potential for vertical assault in amphibious operations, as well as command and control of at-sea forces.

The Soviets have nine cruisers of the Kynda and Kresta classes, both armed with surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles.

The Russian Navy boasts an assortment of guided missile destroyers such as the Kashin's, Kildin's, Kanin's, Kotlin's, Krupny's and so on, totaling about 30. These, for the most part, are new ships with a sophisticated arsenal of both offensive and defensive weapons.

In addition, the Soviets have some 150 gun destroyers and escorts of the Kotlin, Skory, Tallin, Mirka, Petya, Riga and other classes. These are good ships.

Further down the list, there are PC's and gunboats, such as the Grisha, Poti, Kronstadt, Pchela, Shershen and others totaling about 700. These units are important to coastal defense.

I mentioned the Osa and Komar guided missile fast patrol boats. The Soviets have some 120 without help from the United Arab Republic, Cuba or any other ally. You will recall that one of these boats, under UAR control, fired the Styx missiles which sank the Israeli destroyer Elath.

In the amphibious field, in addition to numerous landing

USSR TU-95 Bear

Soviet guided missile helicopter ship Moskva

craft of various sizes, the Russians have over 50 LSTs—eight of the Alligator class and 45 of the Polnocny class. There are more, of course, but this gives you some idea of their capability.

Let me turn briefly to Soviet naval aviation. They have a number of (TU-95) Bear long-range patrol and reconnaissance aircraft.

A relatively large number of Badger medium bombers are also in operation, capable of firing stand-off missiles. Add to this a sizeable force of medium-range reconnaissance, ASW (Anti-Submarine Warfare) and utility type aircraft and it's apparent that the Soviets have a formidable naval aviation arm. Soviet aircraft on reconnaissance overflights are regular visitors to our operating units in the Atlantic and Mediterranean.

Soviet air presence is being felt in the North Atlantic. Coming down through the Iceland-United Kingdom Gap, Russian aircraft conduct random surveillance of U.S. and NATO activities at sea.

Finally, I would like to turn to the Soviet submarine picture. I have saved this discussion for last, because I feel it to be the most important segment of the growing Russian seapower, especially in the Atlantic. This sub-surface fleet is important for three reasons: its size, its capability and its proximity. Let me explain.

As I mentioned a few moments ago, the Soviet submarine fleet is the largest in the world, with a grand total of some 350 boats capable of operating effectively at sea. Of these, about 75 are nuclear-powered. Or, looking at the submarine picture another way: we see about 245 ocean-patrol, anti-shipping type submarines. Both nuclear and conventionally powered. In addition, there are about 65 surface-to-surface cruise-missile-firing submarines and about 40 ballistic missile-firing types in operation. Soviet submarines have demonstrated that they are capable of operating at great distances from their homeland, in numbers, and for long periods.

The size and potency of this undersea fleet is obvious. As Navymen, you can appreciate the potential. But what is also important is their proximity—they can be right out there! They have been—frequently—in recent years.

Of the total of some 350 submarines I mentioned, about 240 of them have direct access to the Atlantic and/or Mediterranean. Of these, about 160 have access to the Atlantic without

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Soviet Capabilities In The Atlantic

(Continued From Page 13)

having to transit the Turkish or the Baltic Straits, or to pass Gibraltar.

When one reflects that Hitler started World War II with a mere 53 submarines, the prospect of another Battle of the Atlantic poses a formidable challenge to the Atlantic Fleet. This could be a most telling theater of war—a fact which we all must understand.

This outline sketch would not be complete were I not to mention the Soviet merchant fleet, their fishing fleets, their oceanic research ships and their intelligence collectors. These are numerous, all under government control, all readily diverted to wartime use. The merchant marine rounds out the balance of Soviet maritime strength. It has a definite place in Soviet global maritime strategy, as well as in pursuit of economic and political penetration policies.

These facts may worry you. They worry me. But, simple number comparisons may lead to erroneous conclusions. There are alleviating features on our side, too.

First, Russian naval aviation has to operate from land bases. Our attack carriers, with their advantage of mobility

'In terms of offense, the U.S. Navy may regard itself as being superior to that of the USSR. In terms of defensive combat capability, they may have the edge.'

and ability to remain at sea for long periods and at great distances from their home bases, are a tremendous plus for us.

Soviet anti-submarine warfare capability does not equal ours, although it is developing. Their amphibious capability is also developing, but does not approach the U.S. Navy for distant, trans-oceanic assault operations. Our naval strategic weapon system—Polaris—is more numerous than the Soviets', but the gap is closing.

Generally speaking, in terms of offense, the U.S. Navy may regard itself as being superior to that of the USSR. In terms of defensive combat capability, they may have the edge.

Maritime Strategies Open To The Soviet Union

I'd like to take a few moments now to explain what this array of strength on the part of the Soviet Union means to us. It's apparent that there are a number of strategies open to them. The Soviets have built their Navy, and are continuing to build it, to be capable of what I believe are quite discernible maritime strategies.

Consider first a defensive combat strategy. This was the Soviets' first strategy and may still be. It means that in a showdown they would exert every possible effort to keep our naval power away from their homeland, to keep it out of position to support forces in Europe.

What does this strategy entail? First of all, I strongly suspect the Russian Navy may give first priority to a capability of defeating or turning back the striking power of our attack-carrier striking forces. To do this the Soviets would muster and deploy their attack submarines to impede the approach of the carrier striking force. When these forces would come in range of the Soviet mainland, we could expect Soviet naval aviation to enter the battle. In the final stages, we might even expect concentrated surface missile attacks from missile boats deployed close to shore for coastal defense. All of this (can happen), if we give them the chance—if we do not quickly limit their options.

Meanwhile, Soviet cruisers and destroyers would probably be looking for smaller, less-powerful Allied units to engage. These surface combatants might be employed to turn back inadequately-protected amphibious operations, for example.

Another powerful option open to the Russians would be to mount an all-out anti-shipping campaign to cut off the flow of essentials to Europe and to interdict military reinforcements. This, beyond a doubt, is the purpose behind their large diesel attack submarine force. This would be a tough battle if it should ever take place. It would be vital to all other Allied success.

Next, let us consider an offensive strategy. Do not forget, the Russians have submarines that can launch nuclear missiles into our land areas. This sort of offensive might or might not come in the opening phases of a conflict. But the capability is there, and it is growing.

With their growing amphibious capability, the Russian Navy could essay landings in the flank areas of NATO, for example, or perhaps in strategic islands. They have the ability to try

'With the number of submarines they have, the Soviets could take sizeable losses and still keep coming. They can exact a very worrisome toll on our shipping. This possibility must be thoroughly understood.'

leap-frogging along the Baltic and Norwegian coasts with masses of landing craft. They could bombard unprotected coastal and inland areas with conventionally-armed cruise missiles from their cruisers and submarines.

The Russians can invest "neutral" countries by use of mer-

COMMANDERS DIGEST

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chant ships. They might do this in Africa, for example. Another possibility is to establish covert bases for extended operations in the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans. In this manner, the Soviets could, in the event of hostilities, seek to close the back door to Israel via the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aqaba by relying on the availability of facilities, say, in Aden.

But above all—and this is such a potential menace that it is worth repeating—the Russians would be certain to attempt to deploy their large submarine force widely in the important ocean areas of the world, especially in the Atlantic. With the number of submarines they have, the Soviets could take sizeable losses and still keep coming. They can exact a very worrisome toll on our shipping. This possibility must be thoroughly understood.

These previous examples are mostly for a war scenario. It is also worth looking at a less-than-war-scenario for a moment—a third strategy.

If one postulates that the ultimate objective of Communist world domination is, in fact, the Soviet objective, it is reasonable that a maritime strategy might be coupled with a policy of expansion and penetration to achieve that objective.

For lack of a better term, let me call this a political strategy —a strategy designed to advance avowed objectives largely for political purposes. In other words, the Soviet Union, in seeking to avoid open hostilities, nevertheless is developing the force to fight if needed. Their maritime forces can be and are an instrument in this strategy. But these forces must be sustained, they must be perpetuated to make the strategy a credible one. With the current building program in the Soviet Union, there is little doubt that this political strategy is indeed credible.

'Freedom of the seas permits the positioning of naval forces, which bespeaks a posture without committing a hostile act of violating any neutrality.'

There may be those who see this option as a commercial, rather than a political strategy. It may be aimed at establishing and controlling important oceanic trade routes and commercial influence through the world. I see these as inter-related strategies, as practically one and the same.

First, consider the familiar operation known as "show of force." Naval units, as you know, are well adapted to this tactic. Freedom of the seas permits the positioning of naval forces, which bespeaks a posture without committing a hostile act of violating any neutrality. Thus, an effect may well be created without actual involvement. Almost any type or size of unit may be used, depending on the degree of effect desired. To uncommitted or wavering nations, a show of force can say much. Or, in the case of an internal insurgency, a sympathetic and readily responsive naval presence may be quite influential.

The circumstance can be moved up the scale and applied in situations of tension. A major deployment timed to coincide with a deteriorating situation can serve to curb the tension or

Soviet nuclear submarine in the Atlantic

to exacerbate the situation as desired—and be influential in any manner desired.

I am sure that you understand this, but it is a subtle matter not perceived by general publics today. Major ground force redeployments or a massive influx of air squadrons to bases closer to the locus of tension cannot be done with the same subtlety.

Deployment of naval units can be an open, off-shore gesture of support to a Communist government, or an in-port instrument actually rendering support.

Then, in the broader aspect of a maritime strategy, the Soviet Merchant Marine can move almost at will and establish a Soviet presence in ports all over the world. This does create an effect and should not be discounted. It is a part of a strategy of penetration, a part of a strategy of expansion.

These are the strategies, then, which I see may be available to the Soviets by virtue of their maritime strength—defensive combat, offensive combat, and political or commercial.

What evidence do we have that the Russians may consider these to be viable strategies?

The Evidence

Since I have been primarily discussing Soviet presence in the Atlantic, I would like to concentrate on that area for a moment. However, their increased build-up in the Mediterranean certainly bears mention.

'I am deeply concerned with this increased maritime presence throughout the world and especially in the Atlantic.'

First, the Soviets have been increasing their Med deployments for some time, and especially since the Mid-East crisis

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Soviet Capabilities In The Atlantic

(Continued From Page 15)

in 1967. Their strength ranges from about 30 ships at low points, to over 60. Today it is on the high side.

These forces include submarines, which appear from time to time. On the surface, Soviet forces are about equally divided between combatants and support units, including submarine tenders. Of course, there are always the ubiquitous intelligence collectors who so faithfully shadow our Sixth Fleet ships.

In the Med, Soviet strategy seems to be primarily political, although there is real strength shown here, too. There is the potential to engage, even against odds. And the Soviet presence undoubtedly has a powerful effect on events in the Middle East.

Second, the Soviets have increased their deployments in our hemisphere. Case in point: The visit last July of two surface combatants and two conventional submarines to Cuba, and associated operations with an additional nuclear attack submarine in the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean.

The exact goals of this visit are not entirely clear. In any case, it was a reassuring gesture for the Castro regime.

Significant, too, is the current level of Communist trade with Cuba. From day to day, there are about 60 Communist-bloc ships in Cuban ports and about 30 enroute. Their maritime policies enable them to carry on their Cuban trade at this level.

Third, turning to the North Atlantic, and again close to home, Soviet warships paid a visit to Iceland recently. What a tremendous way of bolstering the morale of any Communist-leaning sympathizers there.

Fourth, throughout the North Atlantic, we periodically see sizeable Soviet task forces both deployed and conducting exercises. I am convinced that these are training operations designed to help prepare a defensive strategy against our friendly forces should the need arise.

Fifth, Soviet seapower determination is illustrated in their unrelenting efforts to build up their maritime strength. The Russian fleet is new and well-equipped. Soviet crews are skilled and well-disciplined.

'The challenge they now pose is a real one—a modern one. It is a growing one. It is just out there.'

New units are being added to both their Navy and their merchant fleet at a substantial rate. If it continues, the Soviet Union could surpass us in this decade.

The Soviets have declared their purpose to become the world's number one seapower. And at their present rate of growth, they may do so.

This determination was forcefully illustrated in a statement made by Admiral Gorshkov. He said, ". . . The flag of the Soviet Navy now proudly flies over the oceans of the world. Sooner or later, the United States will have to understand that it no longer has mastery of the seas."

Another Russian quote goes as follows . . . "For the first time in our history, our Navy has been made an offensive, far-reaching branch of our defense. Never before has it had such destructive power capability and never before has it been prepared to crush an attack from the sea as it is now. Together with the strategic missile troops, the fleet is now the most important instrument of the high command."

Gentlemen, I make these observations today because I am deeply concerned with this increased maritime presence throughout the world and especially in the Atlantic.

I am sure, as Navymen, that you share this concern. The evidence is clear. Russian strategic options and capabilities are obvious.

I have purposely avoided any assessment of what intentions the Soviets may have for wartime use of their naval and maritime forces. This is a trap which we in uniform must constantly avoid. But, the evidence of what they could do, how they might use their forces, is clear.

As the primary commander with responsibility for the Atlantic, both nationally and internationally, my staffs and I are continually assessing Russian capabilities and how they might be used. No longer are the Russians "over there," halfway around the globe. No longer are they operating an archaic fleet in their home waters of the Arctic Ocean and the Baltic.

The challenge they now pose is a real one—a modern one. It is a growing one. It is just out there.

U.S. submarine Seafolk (SS-402)

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